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Simulated Democracy and Pseudo-Transformational 
Leadership in Hungary 
György Lengyel & Gabriella Ilonszki  
Abstract: »Simulierte Demokratie und pseudo-transformative politische Füh-
rung in Ungarn«. This paper investigates current Hungarian political develop-
ments with the conceptual tools provided by elite and leadership studies. It de-
velops an argument about the institutionalization of simulated democracy, 
which applies to social situations when democratic institutions exist but where 
their consolidation is hampered by the norm breaching behaviour of elites and 
other social groups. The article investigates the responsibility of leaders and 
elites in two sections. First, the failure of the Hungarian elite settlement is de-
scribed. Second, the working of simulated democracy is examined with special 
emphasis on elites’ and leaders’ behaviour in connection to media law, the new 
Constitution and other current institutional developments. In the conclusion the 
authors make an attempt to connect elite and leadership issues to institutional 
developments and highlight some normative consequences. 
Keywords: elite, leadership, democracy, political transformation, Hungary. 
Introduction: The Framework and the Argument 
The new elite paradigm provides an analytic framework and examples that help 
us to distinguish unified and divided elites, and to examine elite settlements 
and elite convergence. It also demonstrates that the structure and condition of 
elites are critical for the survival and development of political regimes, includ-
ing those emerging in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE; Higley 
and Burton 2006; Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski 1998; Higley and Lengyel 
2000; Dogan and Higley 1998; Higley 2010; Best and Higley 2010). The para-
digm also suggests that stability and efficiency of institutional solutions emerg-
ing in CEE, depend largely on the ability of the emerging elite fractions to 
agree upon the rules of the game, and their willingness to accept each others’ 
legitimacy. By the same token, the major postulate is that the conduct of the 
leaders and the quality of elite discourse play a key role in the consolidation of 
a newly established democracy, and that they are important factors for the 
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smooth operation of representative democracy. Democratic institutions can be 
authentic, reflecting the actual adherence to norms, or they can be simulated. In 
an earlier paper (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2010), we introduced the notion of 
“simulated democracy” as an analogy to Lajos Leopold’s “simulated capital-
ism”. This describes a situation in which the institutions of democracy are 
working, but with a low level of efficiency, because the elites and important 
social groups systematically violate the democratic norms. In line with the new 
elite paradigm, we also claim that it is largely the responsibility of the govern-
ing elite whether the democratic institutions are consolidated in their “working 
form”, or whether they remain in a state of simulation, gradually reduced to 
bare facades and institutional skeletons.  
Applying this to Hungary, we argue that most recent developments suggest 
not only are institutions of “simulated democracy” developing there, but that 
they may be in danger of becoming a facade for an autocratic regime. Such a 
diagnosis is by no means isolated. Nowadays political developments in Hun-
gary often occupy columns in the European and even in the US press on the 
grounds that the ideals of representative liberal democracy are being distorted. 
For example, at the 2010 elections the Conservative right-wing party alliance 
led by Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats – Civic Party) won a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority and launched a major institutional overhaul, including a 
change of the Constitution. This generated not only uproar from the opposition, 
but also some severe international criticism concerning the possible anti-
democratic ramifications of these reforms.  
How does the Hungarian scene compare to the European and global scene, 
both ravaged by economic and political crises? We argue that the Hungarian 
experiences of simulated democracy may highlight some more general and 
universal regularities and add to our knowledge of broader political processes. 
More recently, for example, a turn from the left towards conservative govern-
ments has taken place all over Europe, so that in the second half of 2011 we 
find conservative governments in power in the large majority of European 
countries, although mostly in coalitions with other parties. This would seem to 
suggest that the left is in decline, that it has used up its political resources and 
been unable to meet the challenges of the economic crisis and the social and 
political changes that have accompanied it. At the same time, extremist move-
ments and parties have been gathering strength, and the ideals of multicultural-
ism that were heavily advocated in the late 20th century by liberal and social-
democratic leaders have been losing appeal. Government authorities attempt to 
cure real or assumed problems by restrictive measures, such as closing bounda-
ries, imposing stricter immigration laws, and expelling “non-desirable” 
groups1. Still, on the elite level, it appears as if democratic institutions are being 
                                                             
1  As happened in France in 2010 when large Roma groups were expatriated. 
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consolidated: the rule of law and democratic competition are accepted as ‘the 
only game in town’, most governments successfully isolate their extremists, 
and the European Union serves as a safeguard for mainstream and moderate 
political forces. European elite responses to crises, in other words, seem to be 
consistent with declared respect for the fundamental principles of democracy.  
Yet, the conflicts threatening the EU are profound: some ethnic conflicts are 
still unsolved, corruption is widespread, and poverty cum social deprivation is 
common (Gallina 2008). Moreover, some conservative and post-socialist par-
ties enter alliances with extremist or openly racist radicals2 or with people who 
openly revolt against elite underperformance and corruption (Wasilewski 
2010).3 In spite of these destabilizing developments, the multi-party framework 
in other European countries supports some form of solution, and the major 
parties manage to overcome the current problems without abandoning democ-
ratic procedures. In Hungary, however, democratic procedures have been dis-
puted and democratic institutions are increasingly undermined by political 
leaders. 
Leadership problems, however, cannot be understood without a thorough 
examination of elite and mass connections (Kellerman 2008; Wildawsky 1989; 
Lijphart 1980; Gourevitch 1986). For this reason, we attempt to provide a 
broader framework for the analysis of such leadership, elite and mass connec-
tions. This is also particularly useful when analyzing the Hungarian case, be-
cause the Hungarian governing elite and party representatives frequently refer 
to “the will of the people” – something that they claim is reflected by their 
oversized majority in the parliament and on which they base their political 
monopoly for governing. Constitutionally, of course, this majority means that 
all their decisions can be made without having to take into account the parlia-
mentary opposition. The recurring references to the electoral mandate and 
popular will are only superficially related to the concept of “elective dictator-
ship”, a phrase coined in the 1970s in Britain and referring to a manufactured 
parliamentary majority that has little or no effective opposition. The Hungarian 
situation is different, however, in that not all “elective dictatorships” challenge 
their own democratic foundations, while in the case of a simulated democracy 
this cannot be ruled out. 
                                                             
2  As to the former the coalition between the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party with 
Self Defence (SRP) and League of Polish Families (LPR) in Poland and to the latter the 
post-socialist SMER-SD cooperation with the nationalists (SNS) in Slovakia could be ex-
amples. 
3  This was the case in Latvia when at the president’s initiative a referendum sacked the 
parliament when it did not want to accept anti-corruption legislation. 
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Failure of the Elite Settlement 
The situation just described may come as a surprise to those observers who saw 
the 1989-90 elite agreements and the roundtable negotiations as what Higley 
and his colleagues labelled an “elite settlement”. For this reason, and for the 
sake of greater clarity, these developments need to be analysed in a more de-
tailed and critical manner. 
1. The Elite Dimension 
Why is the elite settlement of 1989-90 gradually ‘evaporating’, and why do a 
group that participated in the settlement – the current governing party Fidesz 
and its leaders – now reject that settlement as a fake? What current political 
developments are threatening to undermine the seemingly successful – and 
widely praised – 1989-90 elite settlement?  
The Hungarian Roundtable of 1989 was from the beginning a promising but 
vulnerable construction (Bozóki 2002). It assumed, rather than developed, a 
widespread consensus among the participants on the basic values concerning 
democratic institutions and property relations, and it acknowledged diverse 
political elite groups as legitimate partners. The Roundtable also assumed that 
all participating elite groups would enter into peaceful political rivalry, that 
they would do so in a fair and constrained manner, that they would set a posi-
tive example and promote public trust in the elites and in the new democratic 
institutions. However, these assumptions and expectations soon proved unreal-
istic. From the very start, the agreement reflected elite uncertainty about the 
‘rules of the game’, and lack of confidence in the rivals’ willingness to obey 
the norms of restrained partisanship. Political competition was far from fair and 
constrained.  
The wish to secure a high degree of government stability was predominant 
and the means of government control by the opposition therefore reduced to a 
motion of constructive no confidence. Thus, while Hungary has been looking 
stable, and has been widely praised by EU observers for the stability of its 
governments – in contrast to most other countries in the CEE region (Nikolé-
nyi, 2004; Conrad and Golder, 2010) – the reality seems to be quite different. 
For example, as a result of government and elite underperformance in the 
2000s, the intra-party bargains resulted in replacing Prime Ministers during 
legislative terms – without a popular mandate, without new elections, without 
even an informal inter-elite negotiation and agreement.  
From our elite- and leader focus, it has to be added that, as a result of 
agreement among the political elite, the power of the Prime Minister (PM) has 
been strengthened so that it is no longer parliament in charge of nominating 
and dismissing ministers, but the Prime Minister. This suggests that the institu-
tional rules that make it difficult to depose a sitting PM are being converted 
into a factual impossibility. The central role of the PM has also been strength-
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ened by the development of the party system, particularly on the conservative 
side of the political spectrum, where monocratic leadership has become the 
dominant pattern (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2011). For example, in Fidesz, the 
founding leader, Viktor Orban, has remained uncontested since 19934 when the 
function of party president was introduced (Körösényi 2007). This led Van 
Biezen (2003, 206) to observe that Fidesz has become a prime example of 
personalized leadership, where the party leader is the central decision-maker 
and enjoys many privileges.  
There have also been some other factors at play in creating an image of sta-
bility. The means of dispensing political and financial resources led to early 
stagnation within the party system (Ágh, 1995) so that, with the exception of 
one new party that managed to get into parliament for one legislative term, the 
parties that emerged in the period of democratisation have continued to domi-
nate the electoral game up to the 2010 elections.5 This stability of the party 
system also resulted in a form of elite stabilization. In this manufactured stabil-
ity, some important issues, such as transparency of party financing or political 
involvement in the former regime, have never been addressed. Confidential 
information has been used by those in power, giving rise to political blackmail 
in some cases and to a general lack of confidence among parties in others.  
The activities of the left (Hungarian Socialist Party – Magyar Szocialista 
Párt (MSzP) the state-socialist successor party) has contributed to this climate 
of mistrust. The MSzP has become a devoted advocate of a market economy 
and economic competition, thus blurring the traditional left-right division. As 
Benoit and Laver (2006, 125) note, the Socialists also embraced cosmopolitan 
and pro-EU policies despite the fact that the party continues to have many 
former state-socialist officials in its ranks. This has led the Conservatives, first 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum or MDF (Magyar Demokrata Fórum), and 
then the ascendant new conservative force, Fidesz, to move towards national-
ism, anti-communism, and social populism in order to distinguish themselves 
from their competitors. Over time, the original elite settlement started to 
weaken. The architects of the settlement, above all the MDF, have shrunk, 
while Fidesz – pursuing a strategy of confrontation as opposed to consensus-
seeking – has grown (Ilonszki, 2003). This resulted in the polarisation of two 
political blocs (Enyedi-Bertoá 2011) that peaked in 1998 when only the two 
largest parties (the Socialist MSzP and the Conservative Fidesz) faced each 
other in the political arena, reducing the small parties to a secondary role.  
The culture of confrontation promoted by Fidesz served to distinguish the 
party’s political style from that of the Socialist party, which continued to pur-
sue intra-party bargains, as well as seeking compromises with strong groups – a 
                                                             
4  Except for a short period of time between 2000-2002 when Orbán was the Prime Minister 
of Hungary. 
5  Although their relative strength has been transformed and one even has dropped off. 
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strategy typical of the goulash communism of the Kádár regime. The confron-
tational style of Fidesz also reflected the initial composition of the party: it had 
primarily attracted young radicals who advocated political innovations. Subse-
quently, this objective and the aggressive strategy in promoting their agenda 
were reinforced by the return to government of the Socialists in 1994 (although 
Fidesz had seemed the most popular party before the elections), and by the loss 
of the 2002 and 2006 elections. In this new climate of confrontation, the earlier 
elite settlement was beginning to unravel. By 2006, the two major camps 
started to question the very legitimacy of their rivals. This followed the leaking 
of the Socialist Prime Minister’s speech to his party parliamentary group, 
which had been intended to arouse Socialist party officials from their apathy, 
whereby he admitted that the Socialists had lied about the economic situation 
before and during the elections. This mistake – widely seen as an allusion to a 
self-critical broadcast in the days of the 1956 revolution – inflamed passionate 
anger directed against the PM. It also deepened personal animosity, if not ha-
tred, between the Fidesz party leader, Orbán and the Socialist party leader, 
Gyurcsány. The latter seemed to embody everything that the right despised: 
opportunistic, compromising, with a communist background and a successful 
business career. Any sensible cooperation between the two major elite seg-
ments became impossible.  
2. The Social Dimension 
What kind of society was the elite settlement built upon? Can an elite settle-
ment find a sound basis in a society where the fundamental historical lesson 
that people have learnt is to focus on their personal well-being. The legacies of 
state socialism in Hungary included widespread involvement in the gray econ-
omy, tax evasion, slow and small-scale enrichment, and the expectation of 
social security combined with a lack of political interest and civil apathy. Peo-
ple on the street tended to navigate between conflicting norms, and they used 
one set of norms to neutralize another, seeking personal advantage in all situa-
tions. Such an atomized society, which got accustomed to the misuse of public 
resources with no interest in the public good, was not a sound basis for the 
formation of an elite consensus.  
Hungarians accept democratic institutions, but are among the least satisfied 
– together with Greeks, Portuguese, Italians and Bulgarians – with the way in 
which democracy works in their country.6 It is also true that Hungarians are 
among those who value European attachment most strongly, but are at the same 
time sceptical about the results of European integration (Lengyel 2011). Dissat-
isfaction with national politics and a strong sense of European attachment are 
the main features of the Hungarian political thinking. 
                                                             
6  Own calculation, based on the 2009 wave of the IntUne database 
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Moreover, Hungarians embrace the view that one can only get on in life at 
the expense of others, that life is a zero-sum game in which one person’s gain 
is another person’s loss (Tóth 2009). Hungary is placed in the lower fifth of the 
European ranking with regard to norm adherence – tax evasion, unlawful ac-
cess to state subsidies, and toleration of corruption, while the picture Hungari-
ans paint of themselves is grimmer than reality: perceptions of corruption, for 
example, are largely exaggerated (Szántó, Tóth, and Varga 2011). Institutional 
trust is low; in that respect Hungary is in the bottom of the European league 
(Tóth 2009) and Hungarians report being mistrustful of politicians – both those 
in government and in opposition. In fact, the Hungarian public is below aver-
age in generalized trust, and compared to the rest of Europe, the readiness of 
Hungarians for cooperation and solidarity is very low. For example, they report 
low levels of membership in civic associations, meeting with friends, and con-
tacts with neighbours – which places Hungary at the bottom of the European 
league table in this regard –, as it is on the index of philanthropy: Hungarian 
readiness for helping the needy is the lowest in Europe (Giczi and Sik 2009). 
At the same time, the majority of people assess income differences as excessive 
and expect to be supported by the state (Tóth 2009). It is no exaggeration, 
therefore, to describe contemporary Hungarian society as mistrustful, egoistic, 
state-dependent, with a tendency to norm-violation and a negative self-image.  
This critical assessment is further reinforced when the political elite-mass 
connection is examined. It is argued that the Hungarian society needs leaders 
who enjoy high esteem (Tóka 2006), but this esteem is earned through sym-
bolic gestures rather than by actual performance (Boda 2009). In contrast, 
pragmatic behaviour seems to prevail during times of important political 
events, such as the 2004 referendum concerning the citizenship of ethnic Hun-
garians in foreign countries. With this initiative, supported by the then opposi-
tional Fidesz, the nearly century-old exclusion suffered by ethnic Hungarians in 
neighbouring countries could have ended. All ethnic Hungarians would have 
regained citizenship lost when the country was dismembered in the 1920 Tri-
anon Treaty. Nevertheless, the referendum was unsuccessful: turnout was low, 
and a majority voted against the extension of citizenship. Pragmatic considera-
tions and anxieties prevailed. This was, to some extent at least, engineered by 
the Socialists who “warned” the public that millions of labour seekers and 
social security dependents would “invade” Hungary from the neighbouring 
countries as a result of the extension of citizenship rights. 
The Hungarian political elites have embraced the view that under the sway 
of tabloid politics the populist strategy is the most effective one, which has 
opened the way for competitive populism: an unrestrained vote maximization 
strategy. This was endorsed by elites, and practiced by political leaders, espe-
cially those frustrated by the past defeats. As mentioned above, those currently 
(2011) in power had been frustrated by three unexpected electoral defeats, 
whereby three times, in 1994, 2002 and 2006, they had expected victory but 
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experienced defeat. Therefore they lost confidence in the fickle majority and 
embraced instead the more secure path of populist demagogy. 
The competition was conducted in a climate of the cult of success. The 
leader of the ruling party’s parliamentary party argued in response to a question 
about his financial standing:  
I was brought up in a milieu in which work was not a disgrace, in which you 
didn’t have to be ashamed of the result of work; you’ve got to scratch, to ac-
cumulate, to build brick by brick. If you fail, if you have nothing, that’s what 
you’re worth. 
In a subsequent press statement he said he was leashing out against the political 
entrepreneurs and he didn’t have the poor and disadvantaged in his mind.7 The 
phrasing, however, is indicative of a specific world view. In positive terms, it is 
the creed of industry, growth and acquisition. A more negative interpretation, 
however, is that your value is measured by what you accumulate, by what you 
have. This view questions the value of social solidarity and undermines the 
identity of the underprivileged. Government policies favour the middle and 
upper classes against the lower classes, both in respect of the tax system and in 
the transformation of the working conditions. These elite attitudes help to ex-
plain the 2010 and post-2010 institutional changes: lack of trust in society, 
double talk, manipulation, coercion and the readiness to stir the passions of the 
majority in order to retain power.  
3. 2010 – “the revolution at the ballot box” 
After the unexpected loss of the 2002 elections, Fidesz began mobilizing its 
supporters for direct action in order to destabilize the government. Their first 
referendum attempt over citizenship failed due to the pragmatic concerns and 
anxieties of the votes. The lesson, however, had been learned. The next time 
Fidesz initiated a national referendum concerning reforms introduced by the 
Socialist government, it chose a much more effective strategy, but because 
some questions touched upon issues normally banned from referendums (due to 
their budgetary implications), the National Election Office declared the ques-
tions invalid. However, on appeal the Constitutional Court admitted three of 
these questions. Eventually with a turnout rate over 50 per cent and with 80 per 
cent voting in favor of abolishing medical and university tuition fees. Hunga-
rians again voted for their purse – although by that time their views were rein-
forced by the shock of the Socialist leadership’s confession of having lied to 
the public. The results proved dire. The referendum decisions caused a collapse 
of the government a couple of months later. Mass mobilization worked, and the 
popularity of Fidesz increased. However, to achieve this success, Fidesz had to 
compete as well as cooperate with an emerging movement of extreme right. 
                                                             
7  <http://www.nol.hu/lap/mo/20110321>. 
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It has come as no surprise that at the 2010 elections the Socialist party lost 
support. The other two important parties taking part in the 1989-90 elite settle-
ment (MDF and SzDSz) were thrown out of parliament and two new forces 
appeared; a small alternative-green party, LMP (Politics Can Be Different) and 
a party of the extreme right, the latter winning 12 per cent of popular vote. The 
extreme right achieved a success at the polls because it had embraced contro-
versial issues, such as the deterioration of public safety and “Gypsy criminal-
ity”, and because it mobilized xenophobia, anti-Semitism and pursued an un-
compromising critique of the corrupt establishment. On the extreme right, there 
was no willingness to join the elite settlement, as the right activists defined 
themselves as opposing the entire former parliamentary elite that was portrayed 
as a corrupt establishment. Fidesz, on the other hand, rejected the elite settle-
ment it had originally embraced because of its alleged failures. Moreover, 
Fidesz started questioning the democratic legitimacy of their Socialist rivals. 
While in opposition, Fidesz leaders joined the extreme right in their ruthless 
criticism of the ruling establishment and made every effort to win the extremist 
vote. The questioning of the legitimacy of the rivals and manipulating mass 
emotions prepared the grounds for a gradual dismantling of the 1989-90 elite 
settlement. The dismantling was symptomatic of the deep political and social 
crisis, which it further aggravated, starting a vicious circle of normative break-
down and delegitimation. After a breakdown occurs, it is always hard to restore 
normal elite communication, trust and normative consensus (Higley and Burton 
2006; Higley and Lengyel 2000; Best and Higley 2010).  
The electoral victory of Fidesz in 2010 (in coalition with the satellite Chris-
tian Democrats, KDNP) and the resulting “enabling majority” (68 per cent) in 
Parliament has been described by Fidesz leader, Orbán, as a “revolution at the 
ballot box”. Moreover, it has been seen as granting legitimacy to any decision 
the new government may consider, in spite of the fact that this majority has 
been based on a rather modest electoral victory. In the mixed-member electoral 
system in the first round only 33.8 per cent of the eligible voters voted for the 
Fidesz-KDNP joint list (52.7 per cent of those who participated at the elec-
tions). The SMD-s won 34 per cent of the vote8. Thus the electoral system has 
an obvious majority bias, which had been a vital part of the elite settlement 
strategy favouring majoritarian stability.  
One should also remember that in 1994 the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition also ex-
ceeded the two-third (“enabling”) majority (54+18 per cent). However, the 
victorious Socialist coalition didn’t attempt to change the cardinal laws inher-
ited from the elite settlement. The reasons for this were at least threefold: the 
Socialists wanted to prove that they take the democratic rules and procedures 
                                                             
8  In the second round only the undecided SMD seats have to be voted upon. 
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seriously; the Free Democrats wanted to distinguish themselves within the 
coalition; and the government had to handle a serious budget crisis. 
Leaders and Elites, Institutions and Procedures  
Let us consider the two key aspects of the current political situation: the rela-
tion between leaders and elites, and the core democratic institutions and proce-
dures. 
1. Leaders and Elites 
In a previous article (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2010) we have commented on trans-
formational and transactional leadership. Transformational leaders provide 
vision and inspiration, while transactional leaders are good in negotiation, 
management and provide proper rewards for their followers (Burns 1978; Bry-
man 1996). The literature on global systemic developments claims that pseudo-
transformational leaders may emerge in the process of change. These pseudo-
transformational leaders and their conduct trigger concerns about the quality of 
democracy. They use systematic manipulation for the sake of partisan interests, 
leaders disregard human rights and the democratic institutional framework. 
When pseudo-transformational leaders dominate, the use of manipulation wid-
ens, leaders override human rights and democratic institutional framework, and 
unbiased information is hard to obtain (Masciulli 2009, 472). This seems to be 
the case in Hungary where the current leaders and elites pursue an alleged 
program of transformation by abusing and misusing democratic institutions.  
This is most apparent in elite and leadership rhetoric. The PM often uses the 
metaphor of war and fighting – the relentless search for the enemy and the 
rhetoric of mobilization serve to divert the voters’ attention from the social and 
economic woes, but such a combative rhetoric becomes dangerous during a 
crisis, since it can revive hostile social stereotypes and place the blame on 
specific social groups. The tabloid media reinforce these stereotypes and stir 
the emotions of the masses: “let the top dogs who had lined their pockets” 
whine with fear now. The threat of impeachment became a key instrument of 
media politics and was used to intimidate even former government personnel, 
such as the former PM, who became regarded as an enemy (rather than a rival) 
on both political and personal grounds. A parliamentary committee (without 
participation of the opposition parties) proposed putting the former PM on trial, 
accusing him of mistakes in economic policy decisions during his term in of-
fice. The alleged “crimes” include pay-rises in the public sector (in line with 
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the Socialist election promises of 1998) and other measures that the opposition 
also voted for, and that were supported by the public.9 
When the key intention of a leader is fighting, when the goal of the policies 
is “struggle itself” (as one Hungarian morality play concludes), when the leader 
looks for scapegoats to apportion blame for the national debt, and when exter-
nal foes are portrayed as threatening national sovereignty, the restrained com-
petition and the democratic rules of the game start to crumble. The present PM 
singles out “cantankerous” representatives of the European Parliament whom 
he wants to bring into line with – and he uses here popular slang words from 
his childhood – not too painful, but humiliating symbolic “slaps and blows”. 
These remarks reveal not only personality traits of the leader but also the 
dominant political culture. The vocabulary and conduct are used to perpetuate 
the image of rulers as heroic rebels-defenders fighting against foreign forces – 
in this case, against the European Parliament. This image has been a popular 
Hungarian historical leitmotif, and it is an effective tool of manipulation. Also 
effective is the constructed image of the politician as a “man on the street” who 
even dares to use four letter words and behave non-politically – an image used 
to gain popularity.10 
The leaders of the present government use manipulation and deception and 
evidently lack the components of soft power, especially empathy (Masciulli 
2009, 460-2). This is perhaps not surprising as those socialized only for fight-
ing and winning rarely have sympathy for losers and those who do not want to 
fight, being instead strong in hard power techniques, like force, organization 
and threat, and weak in transactional skills, such as bargaining, persuasion and 
deliberation. Moreover, they are unable to apply self-constraint, which is a 
precondition of consensual elite unification. That was a point made by Zoltán 
Pokorni, the deputy president and former cultural minister, recently the mayor 
of a Budapest district. During the last congress of Fidesz he warned his col-
leagues: “we ourselves are the greatest danger” because due to the two-third 
majority there is no efficient control over the government.11 This was not the 
first occasion when Pokorni, nowadays a marginal voice in Fidesz, warned 
about the dangers and reminded elites about their responsibilities. In 2009, still 
in opposition, he declared: “now people hate Bajnai and Gyurcsány (acting and 
previous PMs at that time), but after half a year they will hate us if we arouse 
these public sentiments”.12 Nevertheless, it is the leader’s attitude to the broader 
elite that informs us about their normative framework and dominant attitudes. 
                                                             
9  At the end of 2011, the new parliamentary majority deprived the ex-PM of his parliamen-
tary immunity and the court of justice started a judicial investigation against him. 
10  E.g., see a blog of another Fidesz politician, a MEP, whose political comments about 
politicians, events etc. have even been commented by the US diplomats. Politicians’ talk is 
always political talk – even if they try to use the style of backstreet boys. 
11  <http://www.nol.hu/belfold/orbannal ujit_a_fidesz_kongresszusa>. 
12  <http://www.klubradio.hu/cikk.php?id=16&cid=88787>. 
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For example, Orbán selects and approves each candidate for the parliamentary 
election, and seems to be in charge of all decisions – large and small – includ-
ing the appointment of the director of the National Opera.  
Another problem – also diagnosed elsewhere in the study of contemporary 
elites (Higley and Burton 2006) – concerns political ‘stacking’. This refers to 
the practice of replacing civil servants en masse, which instils fear, and makes 
political loyalty the most important criterion of assessment. Competence and 
professional merit are subordinated to loyalty, and those who oppose such 
practices are threatened with sanctions, including legal action. The mass re-
placement of cadres undermines the working of public institutions, destroys 
morale and restricts competence. In fact it amounts to the destruction of the 
elite qualities of the ruling groups. 
This elite assault is often disguised by legal-administrative decisions. For 
example, judges were formerly able to serve until the age of 70 – now they 
have to retire at the age of 62. The legal hierarchy has been decapitated, posi-
tions are reserved for the party faithful, and the sense of security, essential for 
the division of powers, has been weakened. Political cleansing takes place in 
the media and in the ministerial bureaucracy without transparency and respect 
for professional norms. 
Students of elites often concentrate their attention on political elites; on 
whether there is consensus about the rules of the game shared by the ruling and 
opposition elite groups, and whether these groups are willing to adopt self-
constraint to maintain the working of democratic institutions. As Higley and his 
collaborators stress, this is an important – but not exclusive – aspect and feature 
of unified and divided elites. Other elite groups, such economic elites, can also 
have considerable influence on ensuring the preconditions for elite reproduc-
tion (Lengyel 2007). For example, top business leaders can greatly constrain 
the range of discretion available to politicians and often get directly involved in 
politics themselves. A good example of influence exercised from outside the 
political elite is the formation of the government in 1994. The fiercest critic of 
the Socialist Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) anchored histori-
cally in the democratic opposition, entered into a coalition with the Socialist 
Party. The Socialists could have easily formed a one-party government, but 
they badly needed a coalition partner in order to get out of the cordon sanitaire 
formed by the new oppositional parties. However, the main encouragement for 
the coalition came from the business sponsors of SzDSz: if the party remained 
in opposition for another four years, it would have been abandoned by its spon-
sors. In this context, careers of entrepreneurs-turned-politicians could be seen 
as providing protection against political and legal attacks, and as gateways to 
valuable insider information (e.g., about lands to be appropriated, or public 
investments).  
It is also crucially important for economic players, such as entrepreneurs 
and bankers, to be close to political power, especially under the conditions of 
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frequent changes in legislation. They benefit from this proximity in two ways: 
they gain information about the direction of change, and – whenever possible – 
they can influence the change, thus protecting their interests. In the current 
government cycle there is another player, i.e. business leaders with close links 
to government as well as to the main ruling party. In other words, there is a 
proliferation of entrepreneurs-turned-politicians that, combined with the wide-
spread occurrence of party donations, and this is probably just the peak of the 
iceberg of the growing interpenetration of business and politics.  
This intertwining of business and politics is facilitated by the lack of the 
transparency of party financing and frequent changes in legislation. Indeed, 
changes in the rules are often designed to promote the interests of some groups 
and sectors – so much so that the managers of banks and multinational compa-
nies are said to be able to tell what relations the directors are fostering with the 
government by their annual balance sheets. A minor rephrasing in the tax law, 
for example, may involve billions of extra profits or losses for some compa-
nies. There are business leaders whose opinions are listened to, while the views 
of others are ignored or discarded. The relationship between politics and busi-
ness is secretive and apt to take sudden turns. Perhaps the most dangerous 
“corrupting factor” is the indebtedness of several politicians. This indebtedness 
makes them financially and politically vulnerable – open to pressures and ma-
nipulation. Some politicians acquired interests in business as entrepreneurs, or 
have positions on directorial boards. They are also vulnerable to business pres-
sures, and they may misuse the information available to them in personal or 
partisan way. 
2. Institutions and Procedures 
Soon after the 2010 elections, a thorough institutional transformation began in 
Hungary. The most important target of reforms was the Constitution, which 
had been re-vamped at the time of the elite settlement in 1989-90. The creation 
of a new Constitution in 2010 was both a symbolic and a pragmatic develop-
ment. It was symbolic in the sense of signalling a new start and separating the 
new “Fidesz period” from the creed of 1990 elite settlement. It was also prag-
matic in the sense of finding institutional arrangements in harmony with the 
social vision of the governing forces. The name of the country has been 
changed to Hungary – as opposed to the Republic of Hungary and a number of 
national symbols have been replaced and modified. This change in wording is 
of major political significance: the republican ideals of political liberty and 
civic participation do not seem to be highly appreciated by the new rulers and 
constitution-makers. 
The constitutional change was very fast. The opposition parties did not par-
ticipate in the debates and public consultations were replaced by public opinion 
research. One of these was even called “national consultation”, though citizens 
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had to respond to closed questions that were difficult to understand. It was a 
highly restricted, if not manipulative, “consultation” disregarding crucial ques-
tions and creating an elite-mass distance with the help of the survey method. It 
was used to cover up the acute lack of the government’s readiness for dialogue 
with the opposition, as well as the absence of real consultations public delibera-
tion involving all major social groups. This fits the general tendencies: behind 
representative institutions an indirect rule takes place, and manipulation of the 
public becomes the rationale of simulated democracy. 
Overall, the government seems to have two major goals: a) to ensure their 
current position by removing institutions that hinder its policies and persons 
that criticise its moves; and b) to secure long term power, even if the current 
power structure cannot survive the next elections. There is not enough space 
here to provide a full scale picture of this transformation – which has been well 
documented in the international press – but a few points are necessary to illus-
trate how these goals are being pursued, and to indicate emerging trends.  
Following the election victory, Orbán nominated (with parliamentary ap-
proval) a loyal supporter to be Head of State and the post of the Main Prosecu-
tor has also been filled in by a party man. The National Election Committee – 
which could serve as an umpire in electoral disputes and referendum initiatives 
– has been restructured. These and other developments undermine democratic 
control mechanisms and the rule of law. As the Prime Minister’s spokesperson 
announced at a parliamentary standing committee meeting, former politicians 
have to be punished by all available means and if means are not available, they 
have to be invented. 
The goal is to ensure continuous power by blocking public and elite control 
mechanisms, in an atmosphere where no one can feel safe. This lack of safety 
serves several purposes. In the first place, existential fears deter criticism. In 
addition, part of the manipulated public might feel satisfied by seeing purges at 
the “top”. Current measures make them believe that such prosecution is appro-
priate and that the purges will only affect those at the top and never reach them. 
This is a lesson still to be learned.  
Media law is another example of how the ruling party is seeking to stabilize 
its current position. International repercussions of the media legislation coin-
cided with a delicate period, the beginning of the Hungarian EU presidency. 
While the PM communicated to his followers that “we won’t let others mop the 
floor with us”, he assured the EU that he was ready to modify the media law so 
that it is in conformity with the EU standards and expectations. And indeed, the 
parliament passed the formal modifications of the media law on points criti-
cized by the EU commissioner,13 but these modifications excluded the most 
important one: the balanced composition of the media council. As a result, the 
                                                             
13  <http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/0/133048b0-39e4-11e0-8dba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1TUCGleei>. 
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Council consists of only pro-government members, all appointed for nine 
years. 
It is time for some illustrations of how the Fidesz seeks to ensure its long-
term power position. This is also being done in a systematic way. For example, 
the term of office of many appointments has been extended, and many posi-
tions have been “immunized” against possible influence by subsequent gov-
ernments. Thus the newly nominated Fiscal Council can veto the budget of the 
government, and the Head of State can dissolve the (next) parliament if there is 
no accepted budget. The function of the requirement of a two thirds majority of 
parliament has been extended to other institutions: the next head of the Consti-
tutional Court and the next President of the National Bank – both during the 
current government term – will also be elected by a two thirds majority. More-
over, the same requirement will apply in their next terms of office as well. This 
kind of glorification of parliament’s overall majority is a double-edged sword: 
it seems to acknowledge the power of the representative institution, but it rather 
degrades it. It might well happen that the next government cannot implement 
its own program, which would be a clear case of abuse of the representative 
institution by a political force and its leader, who made every effort to down-
play the prerogative of parliament during their previous period in office14 (Ilon-
szki, 2007). Meanwhile, Hungarians are waiting for details of the promised 
electoral system reform, which could mean that Hungarian voters cannot vote 
for a working government in the coming elections. 
Quite unusually for a government which includes a large number of law 
graduates, its reform measures seem to damage the ground rules of a constitu-
tional state, relying instead on populist appeals. This is illustrated by changes to 
the taxation system and severance pays with retroactive effect. Such changes 
hit not only political entrepreneurs, but also the average “person on the street”. 
Another planned measure includes abolishing the early retirement of policemen 
and firemen, similarly retroactively. The ill-considered attempts to wipe out the 
private social insurance companies and force members en masse into the state 
system have not contributed to a strengthening of the people’s feeling of legal 
security. All these measures weaken public and elite controls and contribute to 
the sense of uncertainty about the future. 
The new Constitution and the “cardinal laws” which were passed with a 
qualified parliamentary majority have received criticism on several counts. The 
Venice Commission (The European Commission for Democracy through Law) 
of the European Council criticised the new constitutional text, especially for 
referring to the cardinal laws too frequently, and for mixing up principles of 
policy and polity.15 The subjects of the cardinal laws requiring qualified major-
                                                             
14  This was between 1998 and 2002, but without a clear majority at that time. 
15  <http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2011/06/21/venice-commission-vexed-by-hungarys-
new-constitution/>. 
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ity voting to which references – well over fifty in number – are made are often 
cultural, economic, religious issues that are regulated by simple majority voting 
in most countries. The Venice Commission also criticized the constraining of 
the Constitutional Court and found fault with the lack of more specific defini-
tions of human rights. The vague phrasing of these rights allowed more restric-
tions on labour issues and for policies detrimental to employees. In sum, the 
text of the constitution gives the impression that the government is taking the 
opportunity of its two-thirds majority to force its own political, economic and 
moral tastes on forthcoming generations.  
An internationally renowned fiscal expert and financial adviser of the for-
mer Orbán cabinet, Sándor Lámfalussy, said in a conservative weekly newspa-
per before the new Constitution became law that such a law is dangerous: 
“What if a new wave of recession hits?” he asked, meaning that restrictions 
would curb the possibilities of any government to act. A blogger with moderate 
sympathies for the government added: “we Hungarians usually mount the horse 
back to front. Should a new economic crisis develop, we would not be able to 
increase our debt ... and starve proudly, standing up”.16 
Conclusion 
Hungary is going through a difficult path. The economic crisis causes impover-
ishment of large social groups, and social segregation (especially of Romas) 
has taken on a regional as well as an ethnic dimension. The expectations, the 
value system and behaviour of Hungarian society is highly problematic, and in 
our view, it has been largely abandoned by its political elites during the past 
two decades. Can the social fabric of society be strengthened? Can Hungarian 
society resist the Siren calls of extremism? In one 2011 by-election the extreme 
right party managed to get its candidate elected for the post of the mayor in a 
small town that had been in the forefront of ethnic conflict between Romas and 
ethnic Hungarians. Characteristically, Fidesz did not run its own candidate, 
thus indirectly supporting the extreme party.  
The governing elite falls in a trap, and here, Forbes’ (2009, 424) comments 
seem especially salient for the Hungarian case:  
They may shade the truth for the sake of popularity and campaign contribu-
tions and then be trapped by their crafty distortions and foolish promises. In 
short, practical wisdom can be corrupted by the lust for power … The result 
can be disaster for those the successful politicians eventually govern. 
While the joint responsibility of all political elite groups, whether left or right, 
has to be acknowledged, there are certain differences between them, which 
have implications for the prospects of leadership and elite conduct. The Con-
                                                             
16  <http://hetivalasz.hu/uzlet/gazdag-szegenyek-36058>. 
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servatives learnt the workings of power from books – and probably not from 
the best ones. A more sophisticated and also more manipulative power struc-
ture has been invented as a result, and a more open lust for power has been 
instilled in political leaders.  
Our approach is admittedly normative and we think that there are criteria for 
good – as well as for bad – leadership. Good leaders build on the good traits 
and strength of society and not on its weaknesses; they are able to combine 
transformative and transactional styles, they are able to consolidate and not 
only to criticize and mobilize; they are able to strengthen trust, solidarity and 
norm-abiding. Good leaders strengthen the rule of law and respect human 
rights; they do not favour interests selectively, but try to harmonize them.  
As mentioned earlier, the concepts of “pseudo-transformative leadership” 
and “simulated democracy” are useful for the study of certain pathologies of 
leadership and democracy. We are afraid that these concepts fit well the pre-
sent-day Hungarian leadership. To combat the economic crisis, the country 
needs leaders who can convince society not only of their transformative skills, 
but also of their sympathy for the losers, as well as of their capability of mak-
ing settlements that last. The rhetoric of fight and “have-nots are worth noth-
ing” is not a sign of such a political habitus. For these reasons, and because 
norm breaching behaviour is wide-spread within elites and significant groups 
of the public in Hungary, it is justified to talk about a “simulated democracy” 
in Hungary. The exclusivity of partisan interests, lack of self-constraint, en-
meshing of public and private interests, tabloidization of politics, partisan poli-
ticization of professional codes – all these pathologies contribute to the process 
of “simulation”. The current leaders carry the major responsibility for the 
breakdown of elite consensus, for manipulations of passions of the majority and 
for undermining the democratic institutions for the sake of partisan interests, 
which is why it is also reasonable to talk about “pseudo-transformational lead-
ership” in contemporary Hungary.  
Elite settlement in Hungary has failed, and elite convergence seems to be 
unlikely for several reasons. First, the institutional transformations launched by 
the new government have weakened the system of controls, checks and bal-
ances. Second, elite movements indicate further polarization, and at present 
there is no indication that leaders are inclined to observe self-constraint in 
mutual negotiations. Third, leaders treat politics not as rivalry, but as a strug-
gle, and their attempts are directed at cementing their position of power and 
control.  
True, we also observe some strange metamorphoses, as state-socialist party 
cadres turn into democrats, Communist Youth Organization leaders turn into 
capitalists, great capitalists turn into Socialist reformers, and bearded, sandal-
wearing civil right activists turn into suit-and-tie politicians. These are, how-
ever, only roles and ideologies from which to choose at will, that is as long as 
the political realm is still in the phase of transformation. Frequent changes of 
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roles and too many sharp turns do not win public approval, especially of those 
who like to ponder about principles and commitment. Every politician, no 
matter how sharply his or her career has turned, declares that their course has 
been as straight as a bowstring and that their inner values remain unchanged. 
An authentic consolidation of democracy would, however, require a different 
leadership behaviour.  
The conclusions drawn from this critical portrayal of contemporary Hungar-
ian politics are largely pessimistic. One is that the ruling groups entrench them-
selves in power by hook of manipulation or by crook of deception. Most 
probably the populist and racist anti-EU extreme right will strengthen. There 
seems to be little chance at the moment for the Socialists or for the alternative-
green LMP to defeat the ruling alliance at the next elections in 2014. Even 
smaller is the chance of a change in the top echelon of Fidesz to choose a 
leader who can constrain his partisan zeal. Since such constraint is essential for 
sustaining elite consensus, there is little hope in Hungary for elite convergence 
and for changing leadership habits.  
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